First Confirmed H1N1 Cases in Japan: Will It Suspend Visa Waiver for Canada?

I didn’t want to make too much of a side issue on my main blog. On the other hand, I don’t want anyone to think that I didn’t give this matter proper consideration, so I’m posting this here.

In a minor dustup here*, Per asked a rhetorical question regarding the United States. Now that the Japanese authorities have announced that three members of a senior-year school trip to Canada who flew back to Narita by way of a transfer in Detroit tested positive for the new H1N1 influenza virus, the question can be addressed on its own merits. Japan has temporarily suspended visa waiver arrangements with Mexico. Namely, should it do likewise for Canada and even the United States?

Of course not. At least not if it were my decision to make. The relative incidence of the new H1N1 virus reports is still much higher in Mexico than Canada or the United States. The discrepancy is likely to be greater if the incidence of unreported cases is taken into consideration. That three residents of Japan contracted the virus in Canada does not change these circumstances.

But what if the number of reports in Canada or United States reaches a figure comparable to that of Mexico when the Japanese authorities suspended waiver arrangements? I doubt that the Japanese authorities will do likewise with regard to Canada or the United States. The number of new Canadian, American and Mexican arrivals in 2007 were, respectively, 150,046, 730,363 and 26,626. Leaving aside the question of unreported cases, it is far less cost-efficient to impose visa requirements on Canadian and American passport holders. Moreover, there will be economic considerations—specifically, the potential drag on tourism and business activities requiring international travel.

But isn’t this discrimination? Yes, but discrimination is inherent to immigration procedures. I know of no state that treats all nationalities equally, and Japan is no exception. Visa waiver arrangements themselves fall unequally on citizens of states subject to such arrangements and those who are not. The question then is, is the suspension warranted in the case of Mexico? Of that, I’m afraid that I have no opinion on it, other than that a visa requirement appears to be plausible as a supplementary pre-screening procedure. At a minimum, it is not to be dismissed as prima facie useless.

The last point is also highly relevant to the matter of taking other competing social and economic interests into consideration. The screening of all entrants including Japanese citizens at the port of entry and the subsequent follow-up are the essential and by far the most important measures being taken to minimize the likelihood of the H1N1 virus slipping through. Suspending visa waivers, being a supplementary measure, is far easier to be discretionary with.

* It may be my imagination, but it seems to me that one of the quickest ways to stir up controversy is to take up an issue that, however tangentially the case may be, casts Japan and China/Korea in different lightly, one less favorably than the other. That, and “Japan is/is not different” narratives.

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I do not have any experience as an immigration or health administrator. Thus, everything that I have written is, at the end of the day, my personal opinion.

The Strange Japanese Fear of the Taepodong

”The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.”
Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, If Necessary, Strike and Destroy, The Washington Post, 22 June 2006

The North Korean perfection of a long-range nuclear missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country.
Philip Zelikow, Be ready to strike and destroy North Korea's missile test, Foreign Policy, 22 February 2009

The first op-ed, by a former Defense Secretary (Perry) and an Assistant Defense Secretary (Carter) in the Clinton Administration, came on the eve of the first launch of the Taepodong 2 and called on the Bush administration to conduct a preemptive strike if the North Korean authorities continued preparations. We know how that turned out. Zelikow, a career diplomat and counselor to Secretary of State Rice at the time (2005-2007), had opposed a preemptive strike at the time, by his own account arguing:

“(1) attainment of a long-range or intercontinental missile capability would require more tests, so this one did not place North Korea at the threshold of an operational capability; and (2) given point #1, it was better to use the test to draw a ‘red line’ with support from the international community.”

Zelikow believed that the conditions had been satisfied and urged the newly-minted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to draw a red line. We know how that turned out as well, less than two months later.

Note that both op-eds assume that the long-range nuclear missile capability that a Taepodong 2 with a nuclear warhead is a threat to Japan in the same way that it is a threat to the United States (though Carter and Perry are less explicit on that point). This is strange, since it is the 200 or so land-mobile midrange Rodongs that pose an imminent danger to Japanese security. The long-range Taepodong’s deployment will affect U.S. strategic thinking regarding retaliation under the mutual security treaty in the event of a North Korean missile attack on Japan. This is by no means trivial, since this could affect the deterrence value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The situation is further complicated by the fact that U.S. interests will shift somewhat from proliferation to deterrence, thus aligning them more closely to Japan’s. However, the Taepodong does not directly threaten Japan. So where does this implicit assumption by top officials that there is no discernable distinction between U.S. and Japanese interests regarding the Taepodong come from?

I think it all goes back to the late 1990s, when the Japanese government was still reluctant to sign on to the expensive and experimental missile defense system that the United States had been urging Japan to adopt. But it all changed in 1998, when North Korea flew Taepodong 1 over Japan. This was not in itself out of the ordinary if you believed that North Korea’s claim that it was a satellite launch and North Korea had observed, instead of neglected, the proper protocols regarding such an event. Of course no one believed North Korea’s claim and North Korea dispensed with the niceties. So the launch caused great public consternation in Japan and became a material factor in the Japanese government’s decision to sign on to the U.S. program (which Secretary Gates is now trying to pare back under the Obama administration). In other words, it was the Japanese public that bought into the notion that the Taepodon was a threat to Japan. The writers of the op-ed, with nothing else to go by, have unthinkingly accepted this Japanese conventional wisdom.

But why did the Japanese authorities also buy into this idea and agree to purchase a missile defense system that, if you agree with Keiichiro Asao, did not address the main Japanese concern—the hundreds of land-mobile Rodongs whose main targets are on Japanese territory—but was instead actually geared toward the relatively small number of the more expensive and cumbersome long-range missiles that nations such as North Korea and Iran might launch against the United States. In this context, it is interesting to note that major U.S. military facilities located in Japan—the Kanto area and Okinawa—are protected by Rodong missiles.

I’m not ready to draw any definite conclusions from this yet, so I’ll leave it at that for now.

Could Waiting Lines in Hospitals Be a Sign of Efficency?

Seriously.

Newspaper Editorials on the Biggest, Baddest Economic Package Ever: in the Raw

For this.

http://www.asahi.com/paper/editorial20090410.html
2009年4月10日（金）付
印刷
• １５兆円補正―大盤振る舞いが過ぎる
• 企業献金禁止―民主党は本気を見せよ
１５兆円補正―大盤振る舞いが過ぎる
　財政支出１５兆円余、事業規模は５７兆円。過去に例のない大規模な新経済対策を政府・与党がまとめた。
　米国政府に「国内総生産（ＧＤＰ）の２％相当の財政刺激」を約束した麻生首相は２％、つまり１０兆円規模の財政支出を指示していた。しかし、総選挙を控えた与党の議員から「需要不足が２０兆円超とされるのに足りない」といったむき出しの要求が高まり、膨れ上がった。
　この結果、すでに決定ずみの対策も合わせると、今年度の財政出動はＧＤＰ比３～４％程度となる。超大型景気対策をとっている米国や中国とも肩を並べるよ うな水準だ。いくら深刻な経済危機に直面しているとはいえ、先月成立した経済対策の予算執行が始まったばかりの段階で、これだけ大規模な追加対策が必要 だったのだろうか。
　「規模ありき」で性急に検討が進んだため、メニューには不要不急の項目がかなり紛れ込んだようだ。
　検討過程で、自動車や不動産などの業界が与党議員に働きかける姿も目立った。このためか業界支援色が濃い。エコカーや省エネ家電への買い替え補助は低炭素社会への転換を大胆に促すほど厳しい基準は設けず、住宅取得目的の生前贈与減税にも踏み切った。
　各省庁も予算拡大に動いた。食糧自給率向上へ向け減反政策の見直しを進めている農林水産省は、その結論も出ていないのに、従来の減反を推し進める対策費の増額を盛り込んだ。
　世界経済危機に直面し、日本経済も大きな痛手を負った。ショックを緩和し、社会不安を防ぐ安全網を整備し、経済活性化策を打ち出すのは政府の役割である。だが、それにしても「大盤振る舞い」が過ぎないか。
　民主党も２年間で２１兆円の財政出動をする経済対策をまとめた。与野党あげて選挙目当てで規模を競う様相となっており、歯止め役が不在だ。
　政府案では、今年度の新たな「国の借金」（新規国債発行額）は空前の４３兆円超となる。不況による税収の大幅減が見込まれるので、さらに膨らむだろう。新規の国債発行を極力抑え、主要国最悪の財政状態を立て直そうとする財政再建路線は挫折した。「１１年度に基礎的財政収支を黒字に」という旗を麻生 政権は降ろしてはいないが、実際には葬り去ったも同じだ。
　消費刺激型の景気対策は、将来の需要の「先食い」でもある。そのために政府が借金するのは、子や孫の世代へ「負担のつけ回し」になる。一時的に景気刺激効果があっても、長い目でみればマイナス面が少なくない。
　米オバマ政権は大規模な景気対策を打ちながら、任期４年で財政赤字を半減という目標も掲げた。いばらの道ではあろう。だが、将来世代に対し責任を果たすことも、政治の役割である。
企業献金禁止―民主党は本気を見せよ
　小沢代表の進退問題がくすぶる民主党が、企業・団体からの政治献金を全廃する政治資金規正法の抜本改正を目指す方針を打ち出した。
　５年後を念頭に、企業や業界団体、労働組合などからの寄付やパーティー券の購入を全面禁止する。献金が許されるのは個人か、個人のみで構成する団 体に限る。移行期間中は、国や自治体から一定額以上の公共事業を受注したり、物品納入を契約したりしている企業からの献金を禁止する。
　こんな内容を、次期総選挙のマニフェストに盛り込む方針だという。
　言い出しっぺは小沢代表である。
　公設秘書がゼネコンの違法献金事件で逮捕、起訴され、次の総選挙での政権交代に黄信号がともっている。ここはかなり大胆な案を打ち出さないと、国民に愛想をつかされかねない。そんな危機感が背中を押したのだろう。
　動機はともかく、企業からのカネを断つことが実現するのなら、これまで政官業の癒着や腐敗の数々をいやというほど見せられてきた国民は歓迎するに違いない。
　企業献金への依存度が民主党よりはるかに高い自民党との、明確な対立軸にもなりうる。民主党の自浄能力を示すためにも、党をあげて実現してもらいたい。
　まずは、国民に「本気度」を見せることから始めるべきだ。何せ、党首自らが土建業界から巨額の企業献金を受けていた現実があらわにされたばかりだ。批判をかわすためのポーズでは、との疑念を振り払う必要があろう。
　第一に、５年後などと悠長なことは言わず、「政権獲得後、すみやかに規正法を改正する」とマニフェストに明記することだ。自民党の糧道を断つという戦略的な効果も期待できるのではないか。
　第二に、政権交代があろうとなかろうと、民主党独自で企業献金は受け取らないと決めることだ。法改正を待つまでもなく、自らの身を正すのはいつからでも実行できるはずだ。
　民主党はかつて「公共事業受注企業からの献金の全面禁止」をマニフェストに掲げた。だが、小沢代表の時代になって、その文言は消えてしまった。そして今回の違法献金事件である。
　労組などからの献金を失うことへの不安も党内にはある。でも、この問題でたじろぐようでは、民主党への国民の期待は決定的にしぼみかねない。
　自民党も、今回の事件は民主党の党首が起こしたこと、と高みの見物を決め込んでいる場合ではあるまい。政治資金の問題は、国民の政治不信の根底にある。これをどう払拭（ふっしょく）するかは政治全体の責任だ。
　より透明で、より説明責任が果たせるルールを競い合う。それも、次期総選挙の重要な争点である。
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200904110054.html
EDITORIAL: New stimulus package
2009/4/11
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The government and the ruling parties have cobbled together a fiscal stimulus package of an unprecedented scale. The new package would contain measures worth 57 trillion yen in total and require more than 15 trillion yen in spending.
Prime Minister Taro Aso, who promised Washington that Japan's fiscal spending would amount to 2 percent of gross domestic product, ordered a package worth about 10 trillion yen. But the amount of spending increased sharply after ruling camp lawmakers, concerned about the upcoming Lower House election, called for more money.
They argued 10 trillion yen would not be enough to make up for the demand shortfall estimated at more than 20 trillion yen.
Combined with measures that have already been approved, total government spending for economic stimulus measures would be equivalent to 3 to 4 percent of GDP in the current fiscal year. That means Japan's stimulus spending would match that of the United States and China, which have embarked on drastic fiscal expansion to stoke growth.
Although Japan's economy is in a truly serious crisis, is it really necessary to promise such a huge additional dose of fiscal tonic just when the spending plan enacted last month is beginning to kick in?
Because the ruling camp rushed to put together--and expand--a new package, it now seems to include many non-urgent, nonessential projects and programs.
The automobile, real estate and other industries that have been hit hard by the recession vigorously lobbied ruling party lawmakers during the drafting of the package. Probably as a result, the package includes many goodies for specific industries.
The government subsidy programs to promote sales of eco-friendly cars and energy-efficient home electric appliances, for example, lack eligibility requirements that are tough enough to boldly accelerate moves toward a low-carbon society.
The package has also adopted the controversial gift tax break to spur older generations to pass down their assets before their deaths to their children seeking to buy houses.
Ministries and agencies also maneuvered to get big slices of the spending pie. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries secured an increase in outlays to promote a reduction in rice acreage even though it is now reviewing the long-standing policy to raise the nation's dismal food self-sufficiency ratio.
The global economic crisis has delivered a devastating blow to Japan's economy. It is the government's duty to take action to cushion the impact, enhance social safety nets to prevent social unrest and re-energize the faltering economy. Still, the new economic package contains too much lavish spending.
Opposition Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) has come up with its own fiscal stimulus plan that would inject 21 trillion yen into the economy over two years.
With both the ruling and opposition parties competing to win votes in the next Lower House election by promising bigger stimulus plans, there is no powerful political voice warning against such profligate spending.
To finance the new fiscal shot in the arm, the government would have to pile on more than 43 trillion yen, a record amount, in new debt by issuing new bonds in the current fiscal year.
With tax revenue likely to dwindle due to the recession, new government debt will likely grow further.
Such a spending spree is a death knell for the government's policy to curb issuance of new bonds and restore the nation's fiscal health, which is in the worst shape among major industrialized nations.
The Aso administration has yet to officially abandon its fiscal reform target of a primary surplus in fiscal 2011. But it has effectively thrown the target into a dustbin.
A plan to revitalize the economy by stimulating consumer spending actually taps future demand. The government's borrowing to finance such a plan amounts to passing the tax burden on to future generations. Although this kind of stimulus spending will provide a short-term economic boost, it will have considerable adverse effects in the long term.
The U.S. administration of President Barack Obama has coupled its gigantic stimulus package with a goal of halving the federal fiscal deficit during his four years in office. That will certainly be a tough challenge. But Obama seems to understand that a political leader also has a responsibility for the well-being of future generations.
--The Asahi Shimbun, April 10(IHT/Asahi: April 11,2009)
http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/editorial/news/20090410ddm005070100000c.html
社説：１５兆円対策　大盤振る舞いの結末は
　政府は１０日、景気の急激な悪化を食い止め、新たな成長への転換を目指した追加経済対策を決定する。０９年度当初予算が成立して間もない異例の時期の策定に加えて、規模も財政支出（国費）１５兆４０００億円、事業費５６兆８０００億円と史上空前の水準に達する。
　追加対策は景気底割れ回避の緊急施策に加え、中長期を展望した低炭素社会づくりや２１世紀型インフラ整備などの施策、国民の安心や安全を実現する 子育て対策などが盛り込まれる。この筋立ては理路整然としており、無駄を排除しているようにもみえるが、実態は全く異なる。旧態依然とした対策の策定過程 といい、与党の選挙向けとも受け取られる要求に最大限の配慮をしたことといい、与党の言い分には疑問を持たざるを得ない。
　最大の問題は、規模を膨らますことが先行し、それに基づき与党内や経済界などの要求や要望を盛り込むことになった点だ。政府が月末にも提出する補正予算の基礎になる財政支出額は当初予算の一般歳出５１兆７０００億円の約３割にも相当する。
　この時期に、１５兆円もの予算を組むとなれば、党利党略と受け取られかねない施策や、企業優遇、富裕者優遇の施策も少なからず入ってくる。大衆迎合的な施策も入りやすい。景気に効果のある施策を積み上げることで規模を確定するという本来の対策策定プロセスが逆転したことのマイナスはあまりに大きい。
　幾つか例を挙げよう。贈与税優遇措置は住宅購入時に限定されたが１０年末までの時限措置として実施される。４月から税制優遇措置が始まっているエコカーのさらなる購入促進策も講じられる。地上波デジタル化のためのテレビ購入補助も入った。
　環境にやさしい自動車の普及は悪いことではないが、低炭素社会を視野に入れるのであれば、マイカーに頼らなくてもいいまちづくりや地域づくりに力を入れるべきなのだ。
　さらに、０８年度の第２次補正予算で第２子以降に導入済みの子育て支援策を、第１子についても１年限りの措置として拡大する。ちなみに、民主党は中学卒業まですべての子どもに１人月額２万６０００円の子ども手当を掲げている。
　こうした大盤振る舞いは大半を国債の増発で手当てしなければならない。これだけでも０９年度の国債の新規発行は４０兆円台半ばに達する。夏以降、さらなる追加対策が講じられれば５０兆円に迫る。本当に「１００年に１度」の危機であっても、将来に禍根を残す財政運営は許されるはずはない。財政を壊した時、そのツケはとてつもなく大きい。それを忘れてはならない。
090410

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20090409-OYT1T01161.htm
緊急経済対策　「真水１５兆円」を賢く使え（4月10日付・読売社説）
　事業費５６・８兆円、財政出動の真水で１５・４兆円という史上最大の景気対策を、政府・与党がまとめた。
　約１０年前の金融不況時に小渕内閣が出した対策の２倍の規模で、戦後最悪の不況を食い止めるための大胆な財政出動だ。
　巨額の財政赤字というツケを残す「もろ刃の剣」でもある。景気浮揚と成長力強化の効果に優れた「賢い支出」にすべきだ。
　補正予算の編成・成立を急ぐとともにアイデアをぶつけ合い、内容に磨きをかけてもらいたい。
　１５兆円の財政出動で約２０兆円の需要が生まれるとの試算がある。日本経済の需要不足を穴埋めできる数字だ。内閣府は、７％台に上昇しそうな失業率が５・５％程度におさまると見込む。経済情勢からみて規模は妥当と言えよう。
　政策メニューには、雇用対策や中小企業の資金繰り支援など不況の痛みを和らげる応急策に加え、消費や投資など内需を呼び起こす政策も幅広く並んだ。米国など海外経済は早期回復の道筋が見えず外需に期待できないためだ。
　低燃費車や省エネ家電への買い替え補助は、本来の目的である地球環境改善と同時に、売れ行きの回復も期待される。一時的なブームに終わらぬよう、メーカーは補助なしでも売れる魅力的な商品の開発に全力を挙げてほしい。
　一方、贈与税の軽減は子や孫が住宅を買う場合などに限られた。非課税枠の追加も５００万円と住宅購入の促進としては物足りない。「金持ち優遇」の批判を恐れ、使途や金額を抑えたのだろう。
　高齢者の抱える休眠資産を生かして経済が活性化すれば、恩恵は国民全体に及ぶはずだ。効果が出るよう、もっと拡充すべきだ。
　介護職員の処遇改善や介護施設整備への助成などは、成長が見込まれる福祉分野の雇用機会を広げる。ただし、３年間の時限措置では一時的な効果にとどまる。
　景気回復を待って消費税増税などで安定財源を確保し、社会保障をしっかり支えねばならない。
　景気浮揚の効果が高いとされる公共事業も、「環境」や「安全」など優先度の高い事業に絞って追加する。表看板に隠れてムダな事業が紛れ込んでいないか、徹底したチェックが欠かせない。
　対策に伴う国債発行は１０兆円を超え、今年度全体では４０兆円を上回る見込みだ。国債増発で長期金利が上がれば、民間投資の減少や円高などの副作用を招く。日銀による国債の買い入れ増額など、政府・日銀の連携が重要だ。
（2009年4月10日01時50分 読売新聞）

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20090410TDY04305.htm
Record stimulus package must be spent wisely
The Yomiuri Shimbun
The government and ruling parties have compiled the nation's largest-ever economic stimulus package, worth \56.8 trillion, which includes \15.4 trillion in actual fiscal spending.
This package is about twice the size of the one hammered out during the financial recession a decade ago by the administration of then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.
The latest package is a drastic fiscal move aimed at arresting the worst postwar recession, but it could prove to be a double-edged sword as it would generate a huge deficit. Spending must be carried out wisely to boost the economy and strengthen its growth potential.
The government and ruling parties should expedite the compilation of a supplementary budget and its passage through the Diet in order to implement the stimulus measures, and also bounce ideas off each other to ensure the measures will truly be effective.
It is estimated that a fiscal outlay of \15 trillion would generate about \20 trillion in demand. This could compensate for insufficient demand in the economy. The Cabinet Office predicts that the employment rate, which eventually could peak at between 7 percent and 8 percent, would remain at about 5.5 percent or so if the stimulus plan were put into place. Given the current economic situation, the amount set aside for fiscal spending seems adequate.
===
Increasing employment
The measures are wide-ranging as they include moves to secure greater employment, as well as emergency measures to ease the pain caused by the economic downturn, such as financial assistance to cash-strapped small and midsized businesses. There also are measures to stimulate consumption, investment and other domestic demand. This is because the nation's economy cannot depend on external demand from the United States and other countries, as the economies of these countries are unlikely to recover anytime soon.
Subsidies for consumers purchasing fuel-efficient automobiles and energy-saving home electric appliances are expected not only to serve the original goal of helping the global environment, but also help sales of these products recover. And to make sure increases in sales are not temporary, manufacturers should do their utmost, outside of government-subsidized help, to develop new products that appeal to consumers.
Reductions in the gift tax, meanwhile, would be applied only when children or grandchildren receive financial assets from their families for the purpose of buying a home. The upper gift tax exemption limit would be raised by \5 million, but this increase appears insufficient to help increase housing purchases. Apparently concerned that the public would criticize the measure as benefiting only the affluent, government officials and ruling bloc lawmakers specified the target of the measure and decided to expand the exemption limit by only a modest amount.
If the economy is invigorated by the use of dormant financial assets held by elderly people, the entire population is likely to benefit. The scope of the gift tax measure should be further expanded to bring about a more positive effect on the economy.
===
Think beyond 3-year period
Subsidies for measures to boost benefits for care workers and improve nursing care facilities would increase employment opportunities in the growing welfare service industry. But as the subsidies are only valid for a three-year period, the impact would be temporary.
The government must secure a stable financial source to sustain the nation's social security services by increasing the consumption tax and through other measures, once the economy gets on a recovery track.
In regard to public works projects, which are considered very effective in boosting the economy, the focus will be on sectors that need a higher degree of priority, such as the environment and safety. However, thorough monitoring will be needed to make sure such labels are not taken advantage of to disguise wasteful projects.
The issuance of government bonds to implement the new stimulus package likely will exceed \10 trillion, which means the amount for the entire fiscal year will surpass \40 trillion. If the increased issuance of government bonds causes long-term interest rates to rise, it will result in decreases in private investment and a rise in the yen's value. It is essential for the government and the Bank of Japan to cooperate through such operations as the central bank's purchase of more government bonds.
(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 10, 2009)
(Apr. 10, 2009)

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/finance/090411/fnc0904110332001-n1.htm
【主張】追加経済対策　効果の検証が欠かせない
2009.4.11 04:00
このニュースのトピックス：景気
　政府・与党が追加経済対策を決定した。事業規模で５６兆円超、財政支出で１５・４兆円だ。その財源措置を盛り込む今年度補正予算案は経済対策として過去最大で、月内にも国会提出する。
　今回の対策で目立ったのは、何といっても１５・４兆円という財政出動規模である。これまでの対策を合わせると、その規模は２８兆円近くに上り、米国が各国に求める国内総生産（ＧＤＰ）比２％の２倍以上に達する。
　経済財政諮問会議で民間議員が示した必要な財政出動規模の試算でも１０兆円だったから、いかに膨らんだかがわかる。特別会計積立金や建設国債では足りずに、８兆円程度の赤字国債も増発する。
　先進国で突出して財政が悪化している国が、最大の財政出動を行うわけだ。そうである以上、対策効果も最大でなければならないが、それがはっきりしない。
　例えば住宅購入などが条件の贈与税軽減は、株式市場対策と合わせて資産デフレ防止に一定の効果があろう。だが、金持ち優遇との批判を恐れて子ども手当まで拡充した。一過性の効果しかない地方向け公共事業も拡大された。
　成長分野である環境対応に目を向けたのはいいが、エコカーへの買い替え支援にしろ、参考にしたドイツとは買い替えサイクルが違う。省エネ家電の購入支援では、量販店のポイント制度を考慮しないと混乱するだけだろう。
　麻生太郎首相が言うように景気の底割れは防がねばならないが、その財源は国民の借金である。対策でどれだけ需要と雇用が創出され、将来の成長にどう貢献するのか。その目標と効果が不透明では説明責任が果たせまい。
　首相はそれを一定期間ごとに検証し、国民の前に示すべきだ。もちろん、裏付けがないと指摘される首相肝いりである今後１０年間の「成長戦略」も対象になる。
　もう一つ大事なのは、先進各国が景気対策と同時に練っている回復後の「出口戦略」、つまり財政健全化策だ。対策に盛り込まれた税制中期プログラムの改定だけでは具体性に欠ける。
　財政悪化は将来の成長を阻害しかねない。消費税への対応や基礎的財政収支黒字化の目標などをどうするのか。今年の骨太の方針に向け明確にせねばならない。
　過去最大のばらまき対策だったと批判されないよう、首相には重大な覚悟が求められる。

http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/shasetsu/20090410AS1K1000410042009.html
社説　改革を進めてこそ需要追加策が生きる(4/11)
　政府・与党は10日、財政支出規模で15兆4000億円にのぼる「過去最大規模」の追加経済対策を決めた。日本経済の急速な悪化が続くなかで、大型の財 政出動は景気底割れを防ぐために必要な措置だ。政府は、ばらまきを抑えるよう歳出項目を厳しく査定して関連法案づくりを急ぐとともに、規制緩和など構造改 革も両輪で進め、中長期的な成長力強化を目指すべきだ。

環境配慮の対策は前進

　先の20カ国・地域（Ｇ20）首脳会合（金融サミット）では財政出動の推進で合意した。米国や国際通貨基金（ＩＭＦ）は各国に国内総生産（ＧＤＰ）比で2％を超す財政出動を求めていた。今回の対策はＧＤＰ比で約3％になる。

　対策の目玉の一つは「低炭素・循環型社会」を目指し、環境配慮型の需要創出策を盛り込んだことだ。オバマ米大統領が進める「グリーン・ニューディール」 を意識したものだ。家庭での太陽光発電の促進策、環境対応車への買い替えへの補助金、冷蔵庫、エアコンなど省エネ対応家電の購入支援などを打ち出した。

　具体的な制度設計や対策が実施されるまでの買い控えをどう抑えるかなどの工夫は必要になるが、低炭素社会づくりという中長期目標に即し、短期的には輸出不振で苦しむ産業界を支援する対策といえる。

　税制では、贈与税の非課税枠を住宅の購入・改修に限り現行の年110万円から610万円に時限的に拡大する。多額の金融資産を持つ高齢者層から、若い世 代への生前贈与を促し、住宅関連の投資・消費を刺激するのがねらいだ。「金持ち優遇」との批判を恐れたのか減税規模が小幅にとどまったのは残念だ。富裕層 のお金が消費にまわれば経済全体にはプラスになる。

　過去の景気対策の多くは、歳出の中身よりも金額を膨らませ、全国に事業をばらまくことに主眼を置いていた。今回の対策は過去に比べると歳出や減税の中身に工夫した跡はあるが、よくみると本当に景気対策として有効なのか首をかしげたくなるものも少なくない。

　その一例が、就学前3年間の子供に年3万6000円を支給する「子育て応援特別手当」を第一子にまで拡充する措置だ。需要刺激効果は不明なうえ、今年度1年限りの時限措置にしたことで少子化対策としての意味合いも薄い。自民党と公明党の妥協の産物で、中途半端な政策だ。

　公共事業についても、羽田空港の国際化促進や東京外環道の整備など日本の競争力強化につながりそうな項目も入ったが、「整備新幹線の着実な整備」など従来の延長線上の項目も潜り込んでいる。

　国の直轄公共事業の地方負担分を軽くするための臨時交付金も盛り込んだ。国の事業にこれ以上つきあう余裕がないという地方の声に配慮したものだが、恒常 化すれば地方分権や公共事業の規律を損なう危険もある。「農林漁業の底力発揮」「地方公共団体への配慮」という項目もばらまきにつながらないか心配だ。

　緊急時の株価対策も盛り込んだ。政府機関が市場から株式などを買い取る仕組みで、買い取り額は最大50兆円と、東京証券取引所第一部の時価総額の2割近 くに及ぶ。株式相場は3月中旬以降は回復傾向にあるが、今後発表になる企業業績や見通しが悪ければ再び売りが膨らむ恐れがある。株安と実体経済の負の連鎖 が起きて、景気が底割れするのを防ぐ手だてを備えておくことは意味がある。

株価対策の発動慎重に

　ただ、株価の人為的買い支えには副作用があることも忘れてはならない。株価は経営者の通信簿で、株安は経営者に改革を促す力にもなる。1990年代のバブル崩壊直後に実施した株価維持策は経営改革の先送りにつながり、景気低迷も長引いた。

　海外をみても政府による株買い支えは異例だ。株式の需給関係に着目するだけでなく、企業の成長力強化こそが抜本的な株価対策である点を忘れてはならない。銀行が企業の株を大量に持ち、株安が貸し渋りに直結する構造からの脱却も急務だ。

　今回の対策の文章をみると「改革」という言葉がほとんど見あたらない。中長期的に日本の成長力を高めるには、財政による一時的な需要追加だけでなく医 療、介護、農業分野などでの雇用創出につながる大胆な規制改革も進める必要がある。単発の財政刺激策だけでは、生産性の低い部門の構造を転換し経済の足腰 を強化することにはつながらない。

　すでに巨額の財政赤字を抱えるなかで対策の財源調達も難題だ。今回の対策を盛り込む今年度補正予算では国債を10兆円増発する見込み。政府系機関向けの 資金を確保する財政投融資債も約6兆円発行する。大量増発した国債をどう安定的に消化するかについて、政府は日銀などとも連携し十分目配りしてほしい。

HA! Sneak Preview vs. Frankenstein's Monster

Is the description “his actions last year to block the use of Japanese ships to refuel U.S. vessels** around Afghanistan” a gross simplification? I think I went a bit overboard here. The bulk of the current refueling activities was being conducted for the benefit of non-U.S. ships. It was in the initial stages—admittedly the peak—of the operations, before Ozawa took a stand on the issue, that U.S. Navy vessels figured heavily in the picture. But I say I went overboard because I do believe that Ozawa’s standing-up-to-the-Americans sentiments was an important undercurrent—I dare not guess at its relative importance compared to political exigencies on the domestic front—so it is not totally inappropriate, though inaccurate, to refer to U.S. vessels.


“Pundits now say that as prime minister, Ozawa might push for a major rethink of the bilateral relationship. Karel Van Wolferen, a veteran Japan observer, says, "Ozawa might be enough of a switch to make Washington sit up—momentarily—and stop taking Tokyo for granted.”

Before I go on, let me take the time to say something about von Wolferen’s book The Enigma of Japanese Power that’s been on my mind for a long, long time. I thought—still think—that it was a brilliant book. I thought that it was a masterly piece of research, and his central thesis, that there was no there there when it came to Japan Inc.—or so I understood at the time—rang true, still does. However, the book also left me with the thought:Who in the world would want to live in such a bleak place? Yet many people, including von Wolferen and, yes, myself, chose to live. It was like those horror movies where everything looks so normal yet doesn’t. I’ve half a mind to reread that book; older if not wiser, I might gain some insight there. Anyhow…


Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada are reliable allies. As such, they can be expected to be less of a variable for U.S. foreign policy and national security than the rest of the EU, China, the Russia, Arab oil producers, and other countries with which the U.S. has significant relationships. If low maintenance means “taken for granted”, perhaps that’s true. But does anyone say with a straight face, the U.K./Canada is being “taken for granted”? I suspect that there’s another layer of meaning here, often explicitly stated, that Japan will meekly follow the U.S. lead. Not so. Take North Korea. I’m sure the State Department wishes that the Japanese government will
a) Drop the abduction issue and concentrate on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Won’t happen.
b) Side with Israel against the Arabs when UN resolutions come up for voting. Won’t happen.
It is easy to forget that Japan was the first significant Western democracy to extend a hand to China after the 1989 Tienanmen Incident. Likewise that it took enormous pressure from the U.S. to make Japanese “businesses” give up most of the exploration rights to the Azadegan oil fields in Iran. Even with regard to the core of the argument here on the bilateral relationship, that is, the military, the U.S. authorities have taken serious political steps to bring Japan on board with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq.

But what to make of this “push for a major rethink” in the minds of the generic “pundits”, if it happens? I think (I can’t be sure) that I’ve expressed my skepticism at such a turn of events before, and that there is likely to be some noise, but not much change under an Ozawa administration. More important, von Wolferen appears to think so too, if his sly insertion of the word “momentarily” is any indication. So we’re left with a paragraph that apparently implies that Ozawa might push for a major rethink (but not necessarily a redo) but that von Wolferen thinks that not much will come of it. Or are we? Now sometimes, we just have to accept the uncertainty; after all, we’re talking about the future and what will be in the minds of Ozawa and his colleagues then. Still, it is a weird sensation to be led hither with talk of all the things Ozawa has been saying and doing to complicate relations with the United States, only to be suddenly left in the mists of might-iness.

HAHA Bride of Sneak Preview

Have “Conservatives…been spooked* by DJP promises to redirect about 10 percent of the national budget—or ¥20.5 trillion ($210 billion)—toward building what it calls a social safety net, which would offer more help for the old, the poor and the childless, as well as a $250 monthly children's allowance aimed at boosting the nation's plummeting birthrate”?

Maybe, maybe not. (Incidentally, 20.5—actually 22 and counting—trillion would be more like 20% of the national budget.) But first, which “conservatives”? Perhaps the writer means Ayn Rand conservatives who want a dog-eat-dog world. After all, the writer says “redirect” and “social safety net”. The problem is, we don’t have that many of them.

A charitable interpretation is to assume that he is talking about “fiscal” conservatives, but it’s not just “fiscal” conservatives who are calling the current DPJ 2007 manifesto-plus unrealistic with regard to the savings that the DPJ claims to be able to make. In all fairness to the DPJ though, it claims to be able to finance the bulk of the children’s allowances by reordering existing, substantial tax benefits regarding minors and other young dependents. A similar thing can be said for the national pension system, where at least half the tax deductions that corporations take on our economic equivalent of the U.S. payroll tax. So yes, the DPJ’s claims to be able to finance the entire extra outlay, social safety net and all, look dubious; but the counterclaims in turn appear to be inflated.

“Small-government” conservatives will be divided, since allowances and other payments interfere minimally with the market. In fact, it can be credibly argued that the DPJ’s proposals would increase social and economic mobility.

Consider these points, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that “conservatives” here means an ideology-free ragbag of “LDP supporters”, and that “spooked” is a decription of their more colorful expressions of their polemics. Now you could argue that all LDP supporters are “conservatives” by definition. But that would rob the word “conservative” of any meaning. As someone who has recently been accused of liberal usage of the word “liberal”, I see the irony in my efforts to identify and explain the misuse of the word “conservative”.

HAHA Son of Sneak Preview!

Are “[t]he Democrats are a ragbag of independents, socialists and former LDP members set adrift after the last big bang in Japanese politics, in the mid-1990s, when the ruling party lost power for 10 months?” It’s interesting to note that Observing Japan’s Tobias Harris, who is cited as a major source in the story, disagrees with that overall assessment implicit in words like “ragbag” and “set adrift” and believes that the significance of the internal differences has been blown up beyond reasonable proportions. In fact, the bulk of the opposition had coalesced by 1998, after the first post-1955 non-LDP administration (1993-94) and the unholy LDP-Socialist union (1994-96) into two major opposition parties, one of them under Ozawa’s control, which merged in 2003 to form the current DPJ. That’s eleven years of coherence fighting three Lower House and four Upper House elections, including six years of unity and two Lower House and Upper House elections each. This also means that a large number of DPJ members, particularly in the admittedly less powerful Upper House, know national political life only under the DPJ banner or its other, Ozawa-led antecedent’s. I probably disagree with Tobias (yes, he’s a friend) on the degree of institutional solidity that the DPJ has achieved. But it surely has more ideological coherence than its American namesake and almost as much as that of the LDP, especially if you throw in its long-time coalition partner New Komeito; at a minimum, to suggest that its members still remain the products of the political big bang is a gross misrepresentation of the state of the DPJ.


As for people calling Ozawa a “socialist”, I was genuinely mystified. I googled and found one column and a small number of bloggers who claim that the party policy under Ozawa has turned socialist. That’s not something you would think is worth referring to, is it? Moreover, none of the accusations that I found had been hurled at Ozawa personally—which supports a claim that I made about him recently, though that’s beside the point here. But, as I said, I stand ready to be corrected on this one.